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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

DDI 6835-82  
24 August 1982

National Intelligence Officers

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Charles E. Waterman  
National Intelligence Officer for NESA

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Meeting - August 1982

## 1. Lebanon: Implications for the Future

A consensus among all agencies exists that new frictions and probably fighting will occur after the West Beirut evacuation.

-- Israel-Syria: No process to eject the Syrians and Palestinians in the northern Biqa' and North Lebanon is underway.

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It is initially most likely that limited fighting will push the Syrians off the Sannin ridgeline (which dominates the Maronite areas), plus extension of Israeli control along the main east-west highway ultimately to include the Christian city of Zahle. These limited advances would be first steps designed to enhance military pressure on the Syrians to withdraw either entirely or at a minimum to retreat to positions which do not threaten areas under central government control.

-- Interfactional fighting in Beirut and related areas, primarily between the Phalange and leftist Muslim militias, is likely.

-- Phalange moves to reassert control over Maronite areas in northern Lebanon dominated by the Syrian-allied Franjiyyah clan can be expected.

-- Possible longer range tensions are likely between the Phalange and Israeli-nurtured southern Lebanon militias such as Haddad's organization and local Shia groupings.

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In general, all but Israeli-Syrian confrontations become progressively more likely as an Israeli withdrawal actually occurs.

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## 2. Iran-Iraq War:

A renewed Iranian thrust against Iraqi defenses in southern Iraq will probably occur within the next two weeks. Iranian forces have suffered extensively from previous attacks, however, as demonstrated by the following list of noted deficiencies:

- Ammunition shortages (especially 155mm) and storage of ammunition in dangerous proximity to the front lines.
- Skilled manpower attrition. Crash training programs for fire control, air control, and tank commanders of only two weeks duration have been noted.
- Problems in recruitment of revolutionary guards have been noted.
- Regular army advice has apparently not been heeded in recent attacks, and reports have indicated heavy losses by regular units. This situation presumably affects morale of the regular military establishment.

On the Iraqi side:

- The area favors tank and mobile warfare, in which Iraq has a comparative advantage.
- Iraq has successfully utilized mobile defense tactics in counterattacks.

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- Morale is apparently significantly improved in the wake of recent successful defenses.

All agencies present concurred in the judgment that Iraq would probably hold in face of the upcoming Iranian attack, as they have thus far. At some point in the future, Iran will probably shift its area of attack to the north-central area around Qasr al Sharin, although no evidence has yet surfaced that such a shift is imminent. In the longer run, the war seems to be evolving into a lower level border war of attrition. While in theory Iran has the greater manpower pool for its revolutionary guards, a question exists as to the extent of rural willingness to supply manpower for the guards in the war context.

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### 3. Impact of Lebanon Situation on US-Egyptian Relations.

Strains and some damage to the US-Egyptian relationship has occurred, but the duration of the situation is unclear. Egypt has taken steps to distance itself from the United States in areas of strategic collaboration; autonomy negotiations; and over resolution of the Beirut problem. The Egyptians will continue to insist on some United States move regarding the Palestinian problem, but will not and cannot allow the strains to develop into a total breach.

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### 4. Afghanistan

Three developments in the Afghanistan situation are worth noting:

- The Soviets and the Karmal government appear to believe a counter-coup may be contemplated, and Karmal has delivered at least one extremely tough speech with appears to be a warning to the military against such an undertaking. [REDACTED]

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- Afghan/Soviet forces in the Panisher valley are taking extremely heavy losses. Should the Soviets wish to save the

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two garrisons in the area, a new thrust will be required by  
October -- prior to the onset of winter.

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